Constitutional Aspects of the Protection of the Right to One’s Image in Disciplinary Proceedings

Abstract

 The article discusses the scope of protection of the image of participants in criminal proceedings from a constitutional perspective. The author points out the different understandings of the concept of image in legal writing and judicial decisions and notes the significant difference in the intensity of image protection between a suspect and a witness. The article discusses the conflict between two rights: the right to privacy and the right to information. It highlights that prioritizing personal rights, including the right to image, limits the flow of information. It is noted that a prosecutor’s or court’s decision to disclose a suspect’s image represents a resolution of the conflict between individual and societal interests. The publication analyzes the Press Law provisions limiting press freedom with regard to disclosing the image of a suspect. It underlines that publishing in the press any data enabling identification of a person against whom preparatory proceedings are pending directly interferes with their private life, often also family life, and may violate their honor and reputation. The article identifies conditions under which a suspect’s image may be disclosed, such as the need to prevent further criminal activity, help law enforcement establish new facts and evidence, fulfill the educational function of criminal proceedings, and warn and reassure the public. It also indicates that persons widely known to the public enjoy weaker legal protection of their image under Article 14(6) of the Press Law, when the image is related to the performance of public functions. The journalist’s right to report irregularities committed by public or local government officials is emphasized. The author advocates maintaining the current restrictions on the right to information provided in Article 13(2) and (3) of the Press Law, stressing the need to respect the right to privacy. The article presents the view that without these limitations, the fundamental principle of criminal proceedings—the presumption of innocence—would be illusory. The author emphasizes that every person accused of committing a crime has the right to be considered innocent until proven guilty in a public trial with all necessary guarantees for their defense.